Case name: Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.

Opinion filed: 1982-06-25

Docket No.: 80-1730

Citations:
• 73 L. Ed. 2d 482
• 102 S. Ct. 2744
• 457 U.S. 922
• 1982 U.S. LEXIS 140

Case holding summaries:
• distinguishing between challenge to “private misuse of a state statute” and challenge to “the procedural scheme created by the statute”
• "private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment"
• “state employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor”
• “[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.”
• state action doctrine requires only that "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State"
• holding conduct that satisfies "state action" requirement of Fourteenth Amendment also satisfies "under color of state law" requirement, but noting that conduct satisfying latter may sometimes not satisfy former
• stating that an
alleged constitutional deprivation caused "by a rule of conduct
imposed by the State" can satisfy the state action requirement
• private party's joint participation with state officials in seizure of property sufficient to characterize private party as "state actor" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• stating that "it is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action `under color of state law' and the `state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical"
• while challenge to state's prejudgment attachment procedures may be addressed in § 1983 action, private misuse of state procedures or violation of state law does not entail action that can be attributed to state for purposes of § 1983
• private party initiating attachment procedure under state law later successfully challenged as unconstitutional acts under color of state law and is liable for participating in deprivation
• "Court has consistently held that constitutional requirements of due process apply to garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedures whenever officers of the State act jointly with a creditor in securing the property in dispute."
• noting that "a private party's mere invocation of state legal procedures" does not necessarily constitute "`joint participation' or `conspiracy' with state officials" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
• setting forth test for whether a private actor is subject to liability for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
• permitting suit under § 1983 against private corporations exercising "state action"
• "As a matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact that 'most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.'"
• "Action by a private party pursuant to this statute, without something more, was not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a `state actor.' "
• finding that "[t]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that in this context `joint participation' required something more than invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created attachment procedures" (emphasis added)
• "The Court suggested that that `something more' which would convert the private party into a state actor might vary with the circumstances of the case."
• "[W]e have consistently held that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a `state actor.' "
• "without a limit on [who qualifies as a state actor], private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them"
• no state action where plaintiff alleged private actors deprived him of his property in violation of state law; “private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State”
• defendants' actions that are not authorized by state law cannot be attributed to state
• observing that it remains unclear “[w]hether these different tests are actually different”
• “[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.” (quotation marks omitted)
• “Whether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here.”
• noting that most constitutional violations require state action
• permitting suit under § 1983 against private corporations exercising state action
• stating "[I]t is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action `under color of state law' and the `state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical."
• explaining that in order to meet the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conduct at issue must be “fairly attributable” to the state
• “Our cases have . . . insisted that the con- duct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attribut- able to the State.”
• finding that “[t]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that in this context ‘joint participation’ required something more than invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created attachment procedures” (emphasis added)
• prejudgment attachment of debtor's property constituted state action
• describing circumstances in which private party's actions may be considered "fairly attributable" to the state
• discussing the various theories under which a private entity can be held to be a "state actor"
• holding that state action for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes action under color of state law for the purpose of § 1983
• [T]he party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”
• “If the challenged conduct . . . constitutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.”
• SHERIFF PARTICIPATED BY EXECUTING ON THE ATTACHMENT WRIT IN THE STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT AND ATTACHMENT ACTIONS
• explaining that private misuse or violation of a state statute is not actionable under § 1983
• private party invoking state statutory mechanism to attach and sequester disputed property acts under color of state law
• defendant must be a state actor or its conduct must be chargeable to the state
• explaining that the Constitution “protects individuals only from governmental . . . action”
• "without a limit [on who qualifies as a state actor], private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them"
• requiring state action for claims asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
• “If the challenged conduct . . . constitutes state action . . . , then that conduct [is] also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.”
• where the Supreme Court specifically noted that it did not hold that a private party's mere invocation of state legal procedures constitutes "joint participation" or "conspiracy" with state officials satisfying the section 1983 requirement of action under color of state law
• describing the right to seek a garnishment or attachment as qualifying
• action under Sec. 1983 against a private party alleging that his invocation of a state statutory prejudgment attachment procedure had resulted in plaintiff's loss of property without due process
• private use of challenged government procedures with the help of government officials constitutes state action

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